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Recent Decisions
that liberty, however, and in refusing to reach the merits of the child's
constitutional claim by characterizing the claim as groundless, the
decision demonstrated a lack of internal consistency. While purporting
to overrule the non-consensual branch of the in loco parentis doctrine,
the court allowed the school district to presume, until expressly notified
to the contrary, a transfer of parental privilege to use corporal punish-
ment regardless of whether a parent desired such a transfer. Aside from
the aforementioned issue of waiver, this reasoning would appear to al-
low the purportedly overruled doctrine "to come in through the back
door." By refusing to reach the merits of the child's constitutional claim
on the basis of a delegation of parental privilege that the court was
subsequently to find non-existent, the court has left us with no indi-
cation of the validity of the child's constitutional assertions. It is sug-
gested that further judicial clarification of both the rights of the object-
ing but unknowing parent, and of child, is needed before the full
impact of the Glaser rationale on the use of corporal punishment by
school districts can be properly assessed.
Alan N. Braverman
LANDLORD-TENANT-A CONTRACTUAL BAsIs FOR AN IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF HABITABILITY IN RESIDENTIAL LEASEs-The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts has held that in the rental of any premises for resi-
dential purposes under an oral or written lease, for a specified time
or at will, there is an implied warranty of habitability.
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 813 (Mass.
1973).
Plaintiff, Boston Housing Authority (landlord) brought two actions
of summary process against the defendants (tenants)" for failure to pay
rent. The tenants began to withhold rent on March 3, 1969, after re-
peatedly requesting the landlord to repair claimed defects such as leaky
ceilings, improper heating, wet walls, broken doors and windows, and
rodent and vermin infestations. In Massachusetts tenants of premises
leased for dwelling purposes are permitted by law to withhold rent
if those premises are in violation of the standards of fitness for human
1. The defendant tenants were Ruth Hemingway and Ruth Briggs.
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habitation established under the state Sanitary Code and, if such vio-
lations endanger or materially impair the health and safety of the oc-
cupants of those premises; provided the tenant has given written notice
to the landlord of a housing inspection report certifying those viola-
tions and written notification of his intention to withhold rent until
the conditions constituting those violations are remedied. 2 Although
the housing inspection department had issued to the Boston Housing
Authority a report of serious housing code violations, the tenants had
failed to give the landlord written notification of their intent to with-
hold rent.3 At the closing of the evidence, the tenants requested that
the trial court rule that the obligation of the Boston Housing Authority
to maintain the premises in compliance with the housing regulations and
the obligation of the tenant to pay rent under a rental agreement were
dependent upon each other. A further request was that any money
owed by the tenants to the landlord ought to be determined by the
court according to the degree of habitability of each apartment. The
final request was that, even though the tenants had failed to comply
with the notice requirements of the rent withholding statute, they be
permitted to assert the defense of uninhabitability and avoid payment
of rent if the premises were as a matter of fact found to be in violation
of the state Sanitary Code. 4The superior court judge found that the
statutory defense of uninhabitability to the Boston Housing Author-
2. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as section
8A]. Section 8A states in pertinent part:
There shall be no recovery under this chapter, pursuant to a notice to quit for non-
payment of rent .. . of any tenement rented or leased for dwelling purposes if such
premises are in violation of the standards of fitness for human habitation established
under the state sanitary code . . . and if such violation may endanger or materially
impair the health or safety of persons occupying the premises; provided, however
(1) that the person occupying the premises, while not in arrears in his rent, gave
notice in writing to the person to whom he customarily paid his rent (a) that he
would, because of such violation, withhold all rent thereafter becoming due until
the conditions constituting such violations were remedied and (b) that a report of an
inspection of such premises have been issued by the board of health . . . which report
states that such violation exists and that it may endanger or materially impair the
health or safety of persons occupying said premises; (2) that such violation was not
caused by the person occupying the premises .... ; (3) that the premises are not
situated in a hotel or motel; nor in a lodging house or rooming house wherein the
person occupying the dwelling unit has maintained said occupancy for less than three
consecutive months; and (4) that the conditions constituting the violation can be
remedied without the premises being vacated ....
3. In 1969, the legislature amended section 8A to permit notification of Sanitary Code
violations to the landlord by the local housing inspection agency to satisfy the tenant's
duty of notification. Although the tenants began withholding rent after the landlord
received the certified report of code violations, they could not raise the statutory defense
because the amendment was enacted after they began withholding rent and it did not
apply to them. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 355, § 8A (1969), amending MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (1967).
4. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Mass. 1973).
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ity's action for rent was not available to the tenants due to noncom-
pliance with the notification provision, and denied the tenants' re-
quested findings of facts and conclusions of law.
On appeal, the supreme judicial court rejected the superior court
judge's assumption that the tenants' remedies were limited to the per-
tinent statutory provisions. The supreme judicial court held that a
warranty of habitability is to be implied into residential leases, and a
breach of this warranty entitles the tenants to contract remedies of
recission, reformation and damages, as well as a defense to a summary
process action.5
In order for the Hemingway court to make valid use of the implied
warranty of habitability theory, the court initially justified the pro-
priety of judicial abrogation of the common law property rule of in-
dependent covenants. This centuries-old concept provides that the
tenant's covenant to pay rent was independent of any covenant that
the premises were suitable for dwelling purposes, provided that any
latent or patent defects existing in the premises at the inception of the
lease were reasonably discoverable, and that the tenant's promise to
pay rent was independent of a landlord's express covenant of repair
or maintenance. The court reasoned that since the common law lease
was viewed as a conveyance of real property, a logical incident of that
status was the rule of independent covenants. The Massachusetts legis-
lation authorizing rent withholding had altered that status drastically,
but did not annul the rule since failure to comply with statutory proce-
dures precluded avoidance of the rental obligation even if the premises
were uninhabitable as a matter of fact. Consequently, the court's duty
was to appraise the common law in terms of current public policy and
to erase the difference between the common law and modem concep-
tions of the status of a lease by announcing a new rule of mutual and
interdependent covenants.
Property law principles have traditionally governed landlord-tenant
relationships because a lease, at common law, was treated as a convey-
ance of an interest in land.6 The lessor's primary obligation was to
deliver possession 7 of the land, the quiet enjoyment of which he im-
5. Id. at 843.
6. 2 R. POWELL, TnE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 221(1) (1971): 6 S. WILISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 890, at 586-87 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1964).
7. Technically, the conveyance of the leasehold estate gave the tenant the legal right
to possession. Delivery of the right to possession satisfies this obligation. A split of au-
thority exists as to the lessor's obligation to deliver actual possession by displacing tres-
passers or holdover tenants rather than the legal right to possession. See, e.g., King v.
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plicitly covenanted for the term of the lease.9 Because rent was the
quid pro quo for the right to possession,10 once the tenant was in peace-
able possession of the land, his obligation to pay rent was independent
of any defects in the premises, breaches of express warranties to repair1
or total destruction of the structures which rendered the leasehold
worthless.' 2 Absent fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of
latent defects,' 3 the lessor was under no implicit duty to reveal the
condition of the premises at the inception of the lease if a reasonable
inspection of the premises could reveal the existing defects. The tenant
assumed the duty of repair unless the landlord expressly covenanted to
maintain the demised premises once the tenant took possession.'
4
Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880); contra, Rice v. Biltmore Apartments Co., 141 Md. 509, 119
A. 864 (1922). New York, by statute, implied the duty to deliver actual possession into
every lease. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223(a) (McKinney 1968). The technical distinction
between actual possession and the legal right to possession is important when the tenant
abandons the leased demise voluntarily. Absent constructive eviction, that is, the landlord's
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the tenant remains liable for the rent because
he retains the legal right to possession even though he has vacated the premises and even
though the landlord has breached his promise to repair the premises. See, e.g., Stone v.
Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.
Casner ed. 1952).
8. The lessor covenanted to refrain from disturbing the tenant's possession and use,
not to protect and maintain the premises. Consequently, the lessor was not responsible
when a third person, who did not have superior title to the lessor, interfered with the
tenant's use. See Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927).
9. The inherent property law obligation of the lessor not to evict the tenant from
possession for the term of the lease was implied by law into the lease. The cases are
collected in Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1257, 1258-66 (1929) and Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1414, 1420-23
(1955).
10. Rent was the consideration given for the legal right to possession and use un-
disturbed by the lessor. See Conners v. Wick, 317 Mass. 628, 59 N.E.2d 277 (1945); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
11. Even if express warranties were given, property law, not contract law governed.
Hence, a breach of an express warranty by the lessor gave the tenant no right to cease
payment of rent. In Stone v. Sullivan, 30 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938), it was held
that the landlord's express warranty to repair was "secondary" to the tenant's duty to
pay rent and the tenant could not suspend his payment of rent by deducting costs of
repairs. See Comment, Tenant's Remedies for Breach of Landlord's Covenant to Repair, 21
BAYLOR L. REv. 326 (1969).
12. Ware v. Hobbs, 222 Mass. 327, 110 N.E. 963 (1915). The doctrine of frustration as
a defense to the enforcement of a commercial contract has been invoked by lessees claim-
ing that unforeseen events had rendered the lease obligation unenforceable. 2 R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 221(1) (1971). The older cases reject this doctrine and stress
the property view. In Paradine v. Jane, 84 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1646), the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent continued even though he was denied use of the premises by an invading
army. Accord, Fowler v. Botts, 6 Mass. 63 (1809). However, Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B.
740, held that the lessee's liability for rent for a flat to view a coronation parade was
relieved upon cancellation of ceremonies. Frustration of purpose, not property concepts,
was emphasized.
13. 1 AMEiucAN LAW OF PROPERTY I 3A5 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
14. See Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability-Demise
of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20 DEPAUL L. Rxv. 955 (1971); Comment,
Landlord-Tenant: Contractual Basis for an Implied Warranty of Habitability in Leased
Premises, 77 Dics. L. REv. 185 (1973); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An In-
cipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FoRDHAM L. Ry. 123 (1972); Note, Im-
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Furthermore, the landlord made no implied warranties concerning the
suitability of the subject matter of the lease except in the lease of a
furnished dwelling for a short term. 5 The sole warranty was the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, a breach of which occurred when the
landlord or one claiming under a superior adverse interest to the land-
lord interfered with the tenant's actual possession. 16 Consequently, non-
habitability of the premises was insufficient to sustain a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment.' As a result of this common law focus
on the tenant's possession rather than the landlord's service,' the doc-
trine of caveat emptor had as its foundation the property rules of in-
dependent covenants, no implied warranties and the tenant's duty to
maintain the leased premises.
The American judiciary adopted the doctrine of caveat emptor but
carved exceptions into it. In 1892, the Massachusetts court announced
the "furnished dwelling" exception in Ingalls v. Hobbs," by holding
that the lease of a furnished dwelling for a short term contained an
implied warranty of fitness for immediate occupancy.20 A second ex-
ception to caveat emptor was fashioned to accommodate a lease exe-
cuted prior to the completion of the structure so that a covenant
of fitness for intended use was implied into the lease. 21 Finally, the
courts molded the legal fiction of constructive eviction2 2 which per-
mitted the tenant to vacate the premises within a reasonable time
plied Warranty of Habitability in Landlord Tenant Relations, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 580
(1971).
15. In Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843), the court held that the breach
of an implied warranty of habitability was a valid defense to an action for rent due on
a three month lease of a furnished summer cottage overrun with insects. But see Hart v.
Windsor, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843), where the defense was not recognized when the
term for the lease of a furnished house ran three years.
16. Since rent stood for possession, the deprivation of possession constituted a failure
of consideration for the rent and the law abated the rent. Royce v. Gugenheim, 106 Mass.
201, 8 Am. R. 322 (1870).
17. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3A8-.50 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
18. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past
with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FOReDHAM L. REV. 225, 227-39 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Quinn & Phillips].
19. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
20. Id. The court reasoned that whereas the long-term lessee contemplated changes to
adapt to his use, a short-term lessee pays more for immediate use without the expense
and delay of preparation for use. Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286. But see Davenport v. Squibb,
320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d (1947), where the court acknowledged the rule but denied relief
due to a failure to show insect infestation at the beginning of the term.
21. J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on
other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1933). The tenant's opportunity to inspect for defects
is the basis of caveat emptor. If he has had no opportunity to inspect the structure prior
to its completion, the subsequent nonconformity with prior covenants constitutes a failure
of consideration. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 225(2) (1971).
22. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Ct. Err. & App. 1826).
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and to avoid the obligation to pay rent after notifying the landlord
of untenantable conditions caused by the lessor's affirmative acts,
failure to act or actual eviction.28
Because private common law had failed to provide the tenant with
adequate remedies to enforce the landlord's service covenants of repair
and maintenance, legislatures have imposed upon the landlord statu-
tory obligations to the community.2 4 Initially, criminal law sanctions
in the form of fines or imprisonment were designed to compel the land-
lord to maintain decent health, building and sanitation standards. 25
However, because of the ineffectiveness of a fine as a deterrent,26 the
unlikelihood of imprisonment,27 and the inefficiencies of the bureau-
cratic system, 28 legislatures created a private remedy for these public
violations by empowering the tenant to enforce the state and local
codes.m
The Massachusetts legislature provided the tenant with offensive
and defensive weapons which are designed to aid enforcement of the
Sanitary Code,80 without fear of eviction for nonpayment of rent.8'
The statutory options are actions against the derelict landlord in the
23. The breach of the covenant of possession and quiet enjoyment occurred when the
lessee proved a substantial unprivileged interference with his use of the premises which
was caused by the lessor, one with paramount title to the lessor or someone who derived
authority for his acts from the lessor, and resulted in the tenant's subsequent abandonment
of the premises. See Nesson v. Adams, 212 Mass. 429, 99 N.E. 93 (1912). The landlord was
not liable for unauthorized acts of third parties. See Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158
N.E. 264 (1927) (prior tenant wrongfully refused to vacate); DeWitt v. Pierson, 112 Mass.
8 (1903) (acts of other tenants); contra, Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340
Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959) (failure to abandon the premises did not bar equitable
relief).
The theory of partial eviction, used in New York, that the tenant's possession of the
'incomplete' premises results in his actual partial eviction, allows him to suspend rent
until the landlord remedies his breach. See Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y.
370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917); Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N.Y. 293 (1882) (constructive partial eviction
absent abandonment). See generally Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Pro-
posal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 529-31 (1966).
24. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 18, at 239.
25. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1254, 1262-63 (1966).
26. Id. at 1276.
27. Id. at 1279-81.
28. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 839 (Mass. 1973).
29. Id.
30. Pursuant to the authority granted by MAss. GEN . LAws ANN. ch. Ill, § 5 (1967),
as amended MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 127A (Supp. 1973), the Department of
Health adopted article II of the Sanitary Code in 1960. See Appelstein v. Quinn, 281
N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1972), where the court held that section 8A was designed to promote
repairs, permitting the tenant to withhold rents during the period of correction, but
entitling the landlord to recover the increased rents accrued during the period of with-
holding.
31. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 839 (Mass. 1973).
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district court or the superior court,82 or rent withholding according to
a statutory procedure.33 Unless the statutory conditions are met, how-
ever, the landlord retains his common law right to evict a tenant for
nonpayment of rent despite the substandard conditions of the demised
premises.8 4 Consequently, the remedial legislation does not displace the
common law rule of independent covenants.8 5
A minority of courts8 6 have heralded the denouement of the in-
dependent covenants rule by implying a warranty of habitability into
a lease. Courts have found requisite support for the implied warranties
in the common law "furnished house" exception, the concept of con-
structive eviction and principles of contract law. Thus, the tenant's
remedies for the landlord's breach of this warranty are dependent upon
the legal theory sustaining its implication.
If the defect existed at the inception of the lease, the "furnished
house" exception permits the courts to imply a warranty that the
premises are fit for their intended use. 7 However, the covenant may
not extend to oblige the landlord to assume the tenant's duty to main-
tain the premises.3 When the relief is phrased in terms of constructive
32. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127C-F, H (Supp. 1973), allow the tenant to
petition either the district court, id. § 127C, or the superior court, id. § 127H, for a finding
that Sanitary Code violations exist and may endanger the health of the tenant. If the
court makes this finding, it can order rent withholding or that the tenant channel the
rent to the clerk of court. Id. § 127F. The lessor is entitled to the balance remaining after
the costs of repairs have been deducted. Id.
33. The landlord's violation of a state sanitation code standard of fitness for human
habitation is a defense, if properly raised, to a summary proceeding. See MASS. GEN.. LAws
ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1973). See generally Angevene & Taube, Enforcement of Public
Health Laws-Some New Techniques, 52 MASS. LQ. 205 (1967).
34. In Rubin v. Prescott, 284 N.E.2d 902, (Mass. 1972), the court held that section 8A
did not abrogate the landlord's common law right to recover possession of the premises
from a tenant at sufferance even though the minimum standards of fitness for human habi-
tation as defined by the Housing Code were violated.
35. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 813, 840 n.9 (Mass. 1973).
36. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1972); Lemle
v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971);
Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265
A.2d 526 (1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). See also Todd v.
May, Civil No. 1-7211-36 (Conn. Cir. Ct., July 5, 1973).
37. In Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), the court's implication
of the warranty of habitability into a one year lease for a furnished home relieved the
tenant of the obligation to pay rent. The court in Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d
497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963), gave a broad construction to the Pines rationale in its state-
ment that the covenant of possession included the covenant of delivery of possession as well
as a warranty of fitness for intended purpose. See Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Landlord Tenant Relations, 12 WM. & MARY L Rav. 580, 590 (1971).
38. Reste Realty Corp., v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). Although the court's
671
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eviction, and the violation of the covenant of quiet enjoyment does not
amount to a constructive eviction, the tenant may repair and deduct
his costs from the rent even though the landlord is not required to
maintain the premises.3 9 When the implied warranty of habitability
finds its support in contract theory,40 the covenants of habitability and
rent are mutual and interdependent. As to defects in existence at the
inception of the lease, a breach of the implied warranty of habitability
may constitute a failure of consideration rendering the transaction
void as against public policy.41 However, the illegal contract theory
can only be invoked when material violations of the housing codes
exist prior to the execution of the lease, and, since the remedy is ter-
mination of the lease, the tenant who desires to remain after the defects
are repaired has no relief.
When the defects arise subsequent to the commencement of the lease,
the implication of the warranty of habitability is supported by contract
theory. Three separate public policy considerations, first articulated
in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,42 and ratified by other
courts such as Massachusetts, have compelled judicial implication of
the warranty. First, the underlying factual assumptions of the doctrine
of caveat emptor are no longer valid, for the modern tenant's primary
relief for the landlord's failure to remove the cause of flooding of a basement apartment
was phrased in terms of a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment (constructive evic-
tion), the court characterized the tenant's right in terms of a breach of a covenant of quiet
enjoyment, material failure of consideration or breach of an implied warranty against
latent defects. Id. at 465, 251 A.2d at 277.
39. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The repair costs for a leaky
toilet could be offset against the rent owed to a landlord who ignored the tenant's requests
to repair it, for ancillary to the implied warranty against latent defects was an implied
covenant to repair vital facilities. However, Marini did not base its remedies in contract
law for "the tenant has only the alternative remedies of making the repairs or removing
from the premises upon such a constructive notice." Id. at 147, 265 A.2d at 535. But see
Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973), where the court held that the tenant's
covenant to pay rent and the landlord's duty to maintain the demised premises in habit-
able condition were mutually interdependent. See also Note, Landlord and Tenant-New
Remedies for Old Problems, 76 DIcK L. Rav. 580 (1972).
40. The first jurisdiction to expressly imply a warranty of habitability into every lease
was the Hawaiian supreme court in Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969),
where it was held that the tenant could recover his deposit and initial rent payment on a
furnished house infested with rats. Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482
(1969), extended Lemle to unfurnished dwellings and to defects occurring during the term
of the lease.
41. Implicit in the illegal contract theory is the canon of construction that the law
existing at the time and place of the making of the contract is incorporated into the terms
of the agreement. 1 S. WILLSroN, CoNs.Acrs §J 1-16 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1957).
In Brown v. Southhall Realty, 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968), the act of renting the
premises in violation of the housing regulations was prohibited by statute, and the land-
lord had been notified by the Housing Bureau of the existence of the violations; thus, the
lease was illegal and void. See Note, Leases and the Illegal Contract Theory-Judicial Re-
inforcement of the Housing Code, 56 GEO. L.J. 920 (1968).
42. 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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objective in the leasing transaction is a dwelling fit for habitation as
opposed to the acquisition of a property interest. 48 Second, the residen-
tial landlord-tenant law should be consistent with the warranties af-
forded by the law of chattel44 and realty sales,45 where public policy
dictates that the party who puts a product on the market should assume
the risk for the defects therein. 46 Consequently, the landlord, as a seller
of a product, implicitly warrants the fitness for human habitation in a
lease of his premises. The third consideration is the current urban
housing market. Not only is there a shortage of available housing, but
the inequality of bargaining power between the landlord and tenant
often forces tenants into leasing substandard housing.47 Public policy
considerations have compelled the implied warranty of habitability in
leases in order to reallocate the risks and responsibilities of the landlord
and to attain a proper balance of landlord-tenant rights.48
Once the courts have implied the warranty, the definition, limita-
tions and remedies for its breach are developed. Some courts narrowly
measured the warranty by the legislative expression of habitability
found in the housing codes.49 Other courts weighed the materiality of
the alleged breach in light of the seriousness of the defect and the length
of the time it persists. 0 The New Hampshire court had outlined ob-
jective variables that would indicate the parties' expectations as well
as the equities of shifting the burden of inspection and repair.51 Iowa's
supreme court focused upon the bargaining position as well as the ex-
43. The modern tenant possesses neither the skill nor the will to investigate and make
repairs. Consequently, the burden of investigation is shifted to the landlord who is best
able to know the premises and spread the risk over a long term. See Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791, 794-96 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971).
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314,-315.
45. See 12 Duq. L. REv. 109 (1973).
46. The underlying policy reason is that the party's inducement of reliance upon the
landlord's superior skill and knowledge is in a better position to know, control and assume
the risk of defects in his products. See Note, Landlord Tenant-Housing Code Violations,
16 VaL. L. RaV. 383, 391 (1970).
47. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26
Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa
1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
48. Note, Landlord Tenant-Housing Code Violations, 16 ViLL. L. REV. 383, 393 (1970).
49. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jack Spring,
Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 200, 217 (1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87,
91, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971).
50. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (Ct. App. 1972).
Accord, Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 476 (1969).
51. The nature of the deficiency, the time of its persistence, the age of the structure,
the effect on habitability, the amount of rent, the tenant's waiver of the defects, and
whether the defect resulted from abnormal use by the tenant are some factors considered
in deciding if there has been a breach. See Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248,
252 (1971).
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pectations of the parties by construing its warranty to include a war-
ranty against latent defects as well as against material violations of the
housing code,5 2 even if the tenant was aware of the defect at the com-
mencement of the lease.53 The warranty has been limited to the type
of dwelling that is leased,54 to the existence of latent, not patent, de-
fects,5 5 and to the situation where the tenant has afforded the landlord
a reasonable opportunity to repair after adequate notice of a defect that
was not caused by the tenant's wrongdoing. 6 The means of enforcing
the implied warranty of habitability encompass the contract remedies
of damages, reformation, recission,57 and specific performance, 8 the
self-help remedy of repair and recovery,59 and a defense to an action
for rent. Thus, depending upon the court's interpretation of the
warranty and its remedies, the rights and duties of the landlord and
tenant are relatively equalized.
The "new common law rule"60 announced by the Hemingway court
afforded the tenant contractual rights and remedies for the landlord's
breach of the implied warranty. This new rule requires the tenant to
demonstrate a material breach by the landlord in addition to the
tenant's notice to the landlord of the breach and the landlord's failure
to correct it within a reasonable time. A certified housing inspection
report of a substantial Sanitary Code violation is evidence of a material
breach and gives the landlord notice of the breach.61 When the defect
is either a technical violation or no violation of the Sanitary Code, yet
the defect substantially impairs the value of the premises to the tenant,
the court weighs the seriousness of the defect, the length of time the
breach continues and the tenant's oral or written notice to the landlord
of the condition, the possibility of repair within a reasonable time and
52. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972).
53. Comment, Tenant Protection in lowa-Mease v. Fox and the Implied Warranty of
Habitability, 58 IowA L. REv. 656, 667-70 (1973).
54. The court in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972), limited
the warranty to the multiple unit dwelling.
55. Kline v. Burns, Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971), shifted the tenant's common law
duty to inspect for latent defects to the landlord who was better able to bear the cost of
repairs.
56. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (Ct. App. 1972).
57. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791
(Iowa 1972).
58. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
59. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
60. 293 N.E.2d at 843 n.14 .
61. Id. at n.15
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the evidence of the defect being caused by the tenant's abnormal use
of the premises in determining the materiality of the breach. 62
The dissent argued that the definition of habitability should be the
minimum standards of fitness outlined in the state Sanitary Code. 3
The dissent further reasoned that this statute implicitly changed the
common law rule of caveat emptor because it imposed legal obligations
on the landlord for the benefit of his tenants. 64 According to normal
contract principles, the law existing at the time and place of the execu-
tion of the lease is deemed a part of it; therefore, the landlord implicitly
covenants that he intends to comply with those laws defining minimum
standards of habitability.65 The dissent cautioned that a judicial "road-
block"66 which the majority did not consider was the rule of Palmigiani
v. D'Argenio.67 That rule provides that, unless the statute expressly
modifies landlord-tenant contractual relations as they existed at com-
mon law, the courts refuse to imply the existing statute in its construc-
tion of the lease, if such an implication would materially alter the
parties' contractual rights and duties. Consequently, when the court's
refusal to imply those statutory duties is fused with the common law
independent covenants rule, the tenant is denied the benefits of the
statute designed to protect him. Therefore, the dissent argued that the
majority should have reached its result by overruling the Palmigiani
rule and reading into the lease the relevant statutes existing at the time
and place of the execution of the lease. The majority could then sub-
stitute the new rule of mutually interdependent obligations for the
common law rule of independent covenants, and the tenant would
be relieved of his rental obligations for the uninhabitable premises
even though his lease contained no express covenant of repair and
maintenance. 68
The dissent's view is conceptually deficient in its definition and
implication of the covenant of habitability. By refusing to limit habita-
bility to the minimum standards of the applicable Sanitary Code, the
majority's approach preserves the landlord's and tenant's freedom to
contract for habitability (which would be determined on a case by case
62. Id. at 843-44.
63. Id. at 848 (dissenting opinion).
64. Id. at 849, where the dissent notes that criminal sanctions exist for the landlord's
failure to comply with the Sanitary Code, although the tenant has no private Tight to en-
force these statutes.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 234 Mass. 434, 125 N.E. 592 (1920).
68. 293 N.E.2d at 853 n.3.
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basis by weighing the parties' bargain, the existence of a material
defect in the premises and the violations of the applicable codes).69 The
only limitations on this freedom to contract is that the minimum stan-
dards of the Sanitary Code and local health regulations cannot be
waived. 0
Another conceptual inadequacy of the dissent's approach is found in
its view that the applicable law defining habitability is restricted to
that existing at the inception of the lease. If, subsequent to the incep-
tion of the lease, the landlord is required to perform additional statu-
tory duties, then, upon the landlord's noncompliance, the tenant has
no way of obtaining the benefits of those statutes. His remedies are
confined to theories such as constructive eviction. The majority, how-
ever, avoids this hiatus by imposing a continuing obligation upon the
landlord to comply with existing law, an obligation which changes
with current legislative determinations of minimum standards of
habitability.7' Furthermore, the dissent overvalues the precedental
worth of Palmigiani. Palmigiani applies to a statute that implicitly
modifies the landlord-tenant relationship, which was defined by the
common law property principles. However, the majority avoids a rule
applicable to property law concepts because contract law, not property
law, supports the implied warranty of habitability. The majority's more
flexible definition of habitability coupled with the landlord's continu-
ous duty to maintain the premises in livable conditions and its abroga-
tion of the independent covenants rule not only affords the tenant the
benefits of the statutes designed for him, but also permits him to sus-
pend his rent upon a material breach of the landlord's express and im-
plied contractual warranties.
Once the majority had implied the warranty of habitability, it dis-
cussed remedies for the breach of this warranty. Upon adequate show-
ing of materiality of the breach, the tenant can rescind the contract
from the time the implied warranty of habitability was first breached
and he can recover the security deposits.72 If the tenant elects to stay
69. Id. at 843-44.
70. Id. at 843.
71. The majority held that the implied warranty means "that the inception of the
rental there are no latent (or patent) defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises
for residential purposes and that these essential facilities will remain during the entire
term in a condition which makes the property livable." Id. at 843 (emphasis added). See
also id. at 844 n.16.
72. Id. at 843-44. A question left unanswered by the court was whether the court would
require restitution by the landlord of rent paid during the occupancy of the uninhabitable
dwelling less the actual rental value of the premises. The court was not faced with that
issue and did not answer it.
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on for the term, he is to initiate procedures to institute suit or with-
hold rent. Failure to comply with these statutory procedures affords
the tenant no statutory defense to eviction, yet the landlord's breach
of the warranty is a defense to an action for rent and a basis for a
counterclaim for damages equal to the difference between the value
of the premises as warranted and the actual value of what was in fact
received.73
The dissent's final criticism was that the majority's discussion of
constructive eviction, in its outline of remedial relief, resolved related
questions not in issue. The importance of this discussion lies in the
majority's definition of a necessary corollary to the newly announced
rule. Whereas the dissent's proposal merely modified the traditional
landlord-tenant relations, 74 i.e., that the lease is to be construed in
light of property law which is to be qualified by statute, the majority
abolished the common law rule of caveat emptor and created new law.
Consequently, the decision rests on the terms of habitability rather
than Sanitary Code regulations. In order to abrogate the common law
rule, the majority had to explicitly outline the remedial differences
afforded by a contractual approach in contrast to a property view of a
lease in order to preserve a logical consistency in the opinion. The
common law defense of constructive eviction has to be woven into the
new contractual theory to provide for those situations where, even
though the premises were uninhabitable, they do not violate the
Sanitary Code.75 Thus, no remnants of the common law remain to
qualify the rule the majority has promulgated.
The significance of this decision is not in what was done, but in how
it was done. The court justified its adoption of the contractual theory
to support the implied warranty of habitability by means of an analysis
of the current status of the lease, the realities of urban leasing, and
statutory inadequacies. Furthermore, the court's preclusion of dis-
claimer of the minimum standards of habitability found in the Sanitary
Code insures that the subject matter of the parties' bargain (habitable
living conditions) is preserved, despite the inequalities of bargaining
positions. 6 Thus, the court's contractual approach provided it with
73. Id. at 845. The damages are limited to the period the apartment remained unin-
habitable after notice of the breach was given. Id.
74. Id. at 851.
75. Id. at 844 n.16.
76. If the court had likened the warranty to the Uniform Commercial Code's implied
warranties, as the Javins court did, then logical consistency would have compelled the
court's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code's disclaimer provision in section 2-316.
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a new frame of reference within which to resolve and remedy landlord-
tenant problems.
Maureen Ellen Lally
TAXATION LAW-FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-REDEMPTIONS AND RE-
ORGANIZATIONS-The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits are in conflict on the question of whether section 351 or section
304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 governs a transfer of the
stock of a brother corporation to a sister corporation by the common
controlling shareholder in return for stock of the sister corporation and
cash.
Coates Trust v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 480 F.2d 468
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 551 (1973).
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 838 (6th
Cir. 1968).
Section 304(a)(1)l of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides
However, by viewing the covenant of habitability as the essence of the lease, the court
avoided this conceptual inconsistency of the Uniform Commercial Code approach and
established a legal foundation in contract law for its mandate against disclaimer.
1. INT. RLxv. CODE OF 1954, § 304 states:
Redemption through use of related corporations
(a) Treatment of certain stock purchases.-
(1) Acquisition by related corporation (other than subsidiary).-For purposes of
sections 302 and 303, if-
(A) one or more persons are in control of each of two corporations, and
(B) in return for property, one of the corporations acquires stock in the other
corporation from' the person (or persons) so in control,
then (unless paragraph (2) applies) such property shall be treated as a distribution
in redemption of the stock of the corporation acquiring such stock. In any such
case, the stock so acquired shall be treated as having been transferred by the
person from whom acquired, and as having been received by the corporation
acquiring it, as a contribution to the capital of such corporation.
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary.-For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if-
(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from a shareholder of an-
other corporation stock in such other corporation, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corporation,
then such property shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock
of the issuing corporation.
(b) Special rules for application of subsection (a).-
(1) Rule for determinations under section 302 (b).-In the case of any acquisition
of stock to which subsection (a) of this section applies, determinations as to
whether the acquisition is, by reason of section 302(b), to be treated as a distribu-
tion in part or full payment in exchange for the stock shall be made by reference
to the stock of the issuing corporation. In applying section 318(a) (relating to
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